The concept of identity has been seen to lead to paradox: we cannot truly and usefully say that a thing is the same either as itself or as something else. This book is a full examination of this paradox in philosophical logic, and of its implications for the philosophy of mathematics, the philosphy of mind, and relativism about identity. The author's account involves detailed discussion of the views of Wittgenstein, Russell, Frege, and Hintikka.
Table of contents:
The paradox of identity: Plato to Russell; Wittgenstein: Identity not a relation; The need for a sign of identity; Same and self; An Eirenic interlude; Identity and indiscernibility; Arithmetical equations; The identity of events; Personal identity; Being, identity and truth
Table of contents:
The paradox of identity: Plato to Russell; Wittgenstein: Identity not a relation; The need for a sign of identity; Same and self; An Eirenic interlude; Identity and indiscernibility; Arithmetical equations; The identity of events; Personal identity; Being, identity and truth